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Abstract
A novel method of concealing information is proposed. Encrypted data is mixed with noise to add the security. The cost of an
attack increases linearly with the size of the added noise. Since generating noise is cheap, the size of noise can be as large as
possible. However, there are issues in automatically detecting and separating noise in the intended recipient end. This stegocrypto
method also provides protection from traﬃc analysis attack.
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1. Introduction
Protecting information from unauthorized access can be done through various mechanisms, such as applying cryp-
tography. In cryptography, information is encrypted into intelligible data using an algorithm and a key. The strength of
the protection depends on the algorithm and the length of the key being used[1]. Usually, the stronger the algorithm,
the more computation and time are needed. Balancing the cost of protecting the information and the value of the
information is also of our concern. Note that encrypting data is still susceptible to traﬃc analysis attack.
Another approach to conceal information is through steganography. In steganography[5], the information is con-
cealed or hidden in a cover media. Usually, the media is an image, but it is not limitted to that. Concealing information
can also hide communication traﬃc patterns to avoid traﬃc analysis attack.
In this paper, we propose a method of combining steganography and cryptography by mixing noise with encrypted
data to increase the security.
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2. Stegocrypto
An attacker will start the process of an attack after he sees an encrypted data. He would not attack data that he
knows that the data is not part of the message he is trying to gain. For example, he would not try to attack noise. The
idea we propose is to mix encypted data with noise so that the attacker does not know that there is a message. To
explain this, we borrow the idea from steganography. Thus, the stegocrypto idea.
In a conventional steganography, the stream of plain message is embedded into a steam of cover message. The
cover message could be text, image, or in this case is noise. An attacker must shift through the stream of noise to ﬁnd
the message. If the message mixed with the noise is in encrypted format, the attacker has an additional diﬃculty. He
has no option but to attack both the encrypted message and noise. Thus adding another level of security.
Picture an empty and clear channel. In this channel we send a message (information) in clear text. An attacker can
see the message easily. To protect this message from unintended recipients, we can encrypt the message and send the
encrypted message through the same channel.
As an example, we can encrypt ”Hello, World!” using 256-bit AES using ”secret” (without quotes) as the password.
The result is the following string.
U2FsdGVkX19mSFJ5nvUvYk+FSWJCjIDuBaAfunocZLc=
Watching the channel, an attacker can see that there is a message. While the message is in encrypted form, an
attacker can capture it. The attacker cannot gain the original information without knowing the password. However,
the attacker can perform various attacks (such as brute force) in an attempt to gain the original information or the
password used to encrypt the information. The cost of such attack depends on the length of password and the strength
of algorithm being used.
We can increase the diﬃculties by mixing the encrypted information with noise. An example of such a mix is
shown below.
6RBYXFD7C8TTYEQ3TEQL34FB6NGV1IM6JIVK3BTQ
U0F9V4UA8WR48X76C640HQEJIOZ80WTAG8RKTL9Y
H9HEX4EKQZ5E4T9FZ4V8SMVAS7RYLN7PI2NRM2RZ
HPFYGKKZPJ1ANEJT4LM8IW4R0R3W88CWW1Q3DZPV
BA7SU2FsdGVkX19mSFJ5nvUvYk+FSWJCjIDuBaAf
unocZLc=EYA5FVCM694MU7BXJVUPFHXGI411HKJV
L2YMNYP4KH9BOFMBEBMC4LRO2DUN85WBASXJGV4C
EQMPGXB41TMWTPYN3KCV9X1DPFR8TRUTX8XDI1D2
75DW
An attacker does not know where to start the attack. The attacker can try to (brute force) attack the mixed message,
ie. trying to decrypt noise.
3. Security Metric
As we can see from previous section, the attack is more diﬃcult. Can we measure the increase in security?
Let C be the cost of an attack (decrypting the message from an encrypted data). Without the noise, that is the only
cost of an attack. Let k be size of noise (say, in number of characters) compared to the size of encrypted message. An
attacker must also try to decrypt the noise data. Thus, the cost of the attack becomes C′ = C + kC.
Another attack scenario involves detecting and separating noise from encrypted data. Assuming that an attacker
knows how to do this, and it costs less than trying to decrypt noise, this method is preferable. Let the cost of detecting
is D dan D < C. Thus, the cost of the attack becomes C′ = C + kD.
While the cost of attack only increase linearly, generating noise and adding it with encrypted data is easy. There
are various hardware and software noise generators. We can,then, make the k as big as possible by running the noise
generator for a long time.
Since the attacker does not know where to start, and perhaps must create some kind of sliding window, then this
adds to the cost of the attack. The attacker also must know when to stop when attacking noise.
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4. Detection Issues
How can an intended recipient separate noise from (encrypted) data but an attacker cannot? There are various ways
to do this automatically. First, we can create disjoint sets of noise data and encrypted data. For example, in an Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC)[2,3,4] setting we can set the encrypted data to be on curve points and noise to be oﬀ curve
points. Another idea would be to create two disjoint or orthogonal codes and use error correcting codes to distinguish
the data and noise. However, care must be taken so that an attacker cannot perform this easily.
Secondly, we can use markers to indicate the begining of (encrypted) data.
noise ... | marker | data | noise ...
Finding these markers, an intended recipient can thus extract the encrypted data from noise. Marker detection can be
done using a simple pattern matching detector or through (auto)correlation functions. The data can be in ﬁxed length
or variable length. In ther later, there is an indicator of length of data.
noise ... | marker | length | data | noise ...
Another method of marking is by using header and trailer combination. By using this method, the length of data can
vary.
noise | header | data | trailer | noise
However, a new problem arises in this scheme. The noise generator may accidentaly generate unintended marker.
For example, if we use “FF” (one byte data) as the marker then there is a probability of 1/256 than the noise generator
generates that particular number. We can increase the length of the marker to reduce the probability. For example,
if we use two bytes data as the marker then the probability of accidentaly generating unintended marker becomes
1/2562. We can continue increasing the length of the marker. Unfortunately, increasing the length of the marker
makes it easier for an attacker to identify it since it may be repeated in the stream of mixed data.
5. Conclusion
Concealing encrypted data through noise addition increase the cost of attack. Although the additional security is
linear in fashion, generating noise is very easy. The cost of generating noise is low, thus the noise to data ratio can be
very large. This method also provides protection for traﬃc analysis attack.
Automatic detection and separating (encrypted) data from noise in the recipient end is still an issue. Progress is
being made in this area.
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